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Executive summary of “Determinants of Entrepreneurial Activities in China” 
 
This paper studies the determinants of entrepreneurial activities in China, which is one 
of the worlds’ four biggest emerging economies. Since 1978, China has undergone a 
gradual transition from a centrally planned economy dominated by public ownership 
to a market economy through selective privatization of state-owned enterprises (Cao, 
Qian, and Weingast, 1999; Bai, Li, Tao and Wang, 2000; Bai, Lu, and Tao, 2006a). 
With the dominant and yet inefficient state-owned enterprises, there have been 
ideological biases against private sector development throughout China’s economic 
reform.  Indeed private enterprises were not even formally permitted to exist until 
1988 – ten years after China initiated its economic reform. As a result, private 
enterprises have been subject to expropriation of their private properties and 
discrimination in business dealings including contract enforcement. The institutional 
environment, which includes property rights protection and contract enforcement 
(North, 1990), has been rather unfavorable for the emergence and development of 
China’s private enterprises. This is in sharp contrast to the case of the developed 
economies where the institutional environment is conductive to the entrepreneurial 
activities and only the personal attributes of would-be entrepreneurs determine their 
entrepreneurship decision. 
 
With the dominance of public ownership, both before and after the economic reform 
of 1978, China’s would-be entrepreneurs generally have had working experience in 
enterprises of varying degrees of state ownership or public organizations or 
government agencies. The decision to become an entrepreneur often means quitting a 
position in an entity of public ownership and starting a private-ownership business 
with ambiguous legal status; hence in China entrepreneurship is often referred to as 
“jumping into the sea”. In particular, there are a set of personal attributes of would-be 
entrepreneurs (such as the political participation of would-be entrepreneurs as well as 
the public-ownership status of their current employers) that determine their payoffs 
from remaining in the public-ownership entities and therefore deter them from 
becoming entrepreneurs.  
 
We thus propose that the entrepreneurial decision in China is shaped by the 
institutional environment for private ownership on the one hand and by the personal 
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attributes of would-be entrepreneurs on the other hand. Using a life-histories survey 
data of 2,854 respondents from twenty cities in China, we find strong support for the 
role of institutional environment in the entrepreneurship decision, and for the 
importance of the personal attributes of would-be entrepreneurs such as the public-
ownership status of their current employers and their status within those entities that 
determine their costs of entrepreneurship. In addition, we find evidence for the 
interactions between the institutional environment and these personal attributes, 
consistent with the theoretical argument that the legal environment for private 
enterprises affects the premium placed by would-be entrepreneurs on their payoffs 
from employment in public-ownership entities. Our results are also robust to the 
controls for general determinants of entrepreneurship that have been found to be 
important in the existing literature (such as gender, marital status, age, education, 
financial conditions, and altitude for taking business risks); and the impacts of some 
of these general determinants are also found to depend on the institutional 
environment for private sector development.  
 
Entrepreneurship has been recognized as one of the driving forces for market 
competitiveness and economic growth in the emerging economies. Our study on the 
determinants of entrepreneurial activities in China highlights the importance of the 
institutional environment for private sector development and has important 
implications for policy recommendations. 
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Determinants of Entrepreneurial Activities in China 
 
Abstract: The institutional environment – including protection of private properties 
and contract enforcement – has been rather unfavorable for the emergence and 
development of China’s private enterprises. This is in sharp contrast to the case of the 
developed economies where the institutional environment is conductive to the 
entrepreneurial activities and only the personal attributes of would-be entrepreneurs 
determine their entrepreneurship decision. We thus propose a theoretical framework 
for the entrepreneurship decision in China with a focus on the role of institutional 
environment. Using a life-histories survey data of 2,854 respondents from twenty 
cities in China, we find strong support for the impacts of the institutional environment 





Entrepreneurship has been recognized as one of the driving forces for market 
competitiveness and economic growth. Business venturing introduces newer and 
better products and services, or offers existing products and services at lower costs, 
unleashing what Joseph Schumpeter called the forces of creative destruction 
(Schumpeter, 1976). To fend off potential competition from start-ups, large and 
established corporations have tried to nurture intra-firm entrepreneurial activities. 
Meanwhile, national and regional governments have raced to introduce policies that 
facilitate business venturing and encourage entrepreneurial spirits of their people.1 
 
Behind firm strategies and government policies, there is a need for understanding the 
determinants of entrepreneurial activities. Existing studies have uncovered a set of 
                                                 
1  Some of the U.S. startups are set up by university researchers whose original research has been 
supported by government funding agencies. See for example Shane (2002), and Powers and McDougall 
(2005). In some of the East Asian countries, there are more explicit government policies promoting 
entrepreneurship (for example, the National Day celebration speech made by Singapore Prime Minister 
Lee Hsien Loong on August 2, 2005).  
 4
personal attributes of would-be entrepreneurs, such as gender, marriage status, age, 
education, financial conditions and altitude for taking business risks that may affect 
their entrepreneurial activities. Entrepreneurs are usually young, married males with 
reasonable levels of education, excellent personal financial conditions and preference 
for taking business risks (see, for example, Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen, 1994; 
Blanchflower, and Oswald, 1998; Lévesque and Minniti, 2006).  
 
This paper studies the determinants of entrepreneurial activities in China. Before 1978, 
China was a centrally planned economy dominated by public ownership; and since 
then it has undergone a transition to a market economy through privatization of state-
owned enterprises and establishment of private enterprises (McMillan and Woodruff, 
2002). Unlike the formerly centrally planned economies in the Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union where private ownership has arisen quickly through massive 
privatization of state-owned enterprises and mushrooming establishment of private 
enterprises, China has taken a gradual approach to privatizing its state-owned 
enterprises (Cao, Qian, and Weingast, 1999; Bai, Li, Tao and Wang, 2000; Bai, Lu, 
and Tao, 2006a). More importantly, with the dominant yet inefficient state-owned 
enterprises, there have been ideological biases against private sector development 
throughout China’s economic reform.  Indeed private enterprises were not even 
formally permitted to exist until 1988 – ten years after China started its economic 
reform in 1978. As a result, private enterprises have been subject to expropriation of 
their private properties and discrimination in business dealings including contract 
enforcement. The institutional environment, which includes property rights protection 
and contract enforcement (North, 1990), has been rather unfavorable for the 
emergence and development of China’s private enterprises. This is in sharp contrast to 
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the case of the developed economies where the institutional environment is 
conductive to the entrepreneurial activities and only the personal attributes of would-
be entrepreneurs determine their entrepreneurship decision. 
 
With the dominance of public ownership, both before and after the economic reform 
initiated in 1978, China’s would-be entrepreneurs generally have had working 
experience in enterprises of varying degrees of state ownership or public 
organizations or government agencies. The decision to become an entrepreneur often 
means quitting a position in an entity of public ownership and starting a private-
ownership business with ambiguous legal status; hence in China entrepreneurship is 
often referred to as “jumping into the sea”. In particular, there are a set of personal 
attributes (such as the political participation of would-be entrepreneurs as well as the 
public-ownership status of their current employers) that determine their payoffs from 
remaining in the public-ownership entities and therefore deter them from becoming 
entrepreneurs. We thus propose that the entrepreneurial decision in China is shaped by 
the institutional environment for private ownership on the one hand and by the 
personal attributes of would-be entrepreneurs on the other hand. We further propose 
that the impacts of the personal attributes of would-be entrepreneurs, including both 
those found in the literature and those specifically relevant to China (political 
participation and public-ownership status of their employers) may change as China’s 
institutional environment for private ownership evolves. Using a life-histories survey 
data, this paper attempts to uncover the impacts of the institutional environment and 
the personal attributes of would-be entrepreneurs on their entrepreneurial decision.   
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline a theoretical framework 
about the determinants of entrepreneurial activities in the emerging economy of China, 
and develop testable hypotheses accordingly. In Section 3, the data set is described 
and key variables are constructed. The method of econometric analysis and the 
empirical results are presented in Section 4. The paper concludes with Section 5.  
 
 
2. A Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
 
In his seminal work, North (1990) has established the importance of a country’s 
institutions in determining its economic performance. Institutions are the rules of 
games in a society or, more formally, are humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interactions. While institutions could be of many types, the one affecting firm 
operation and performance the most is the economic institutions. Douglas North has 
subsequently elaborated on the two basic elements in the economic institutions: 
protection of private property rights (vertical relation between the state and firms), 
and enforcement of contracts between economic agents (horizontal relation between 
firms). 
 
In most developed economies, there are both secure protection of private property 
rights and efficient contract enforcement. Thus the economic institutions are 
conductive to firm operation and performance including entrepreneurial activities. 
Under these circumstances, the decision of entrepreneurship is entirely determined by 
the personal attributes of would-be entrepreneurs such as gender, marriage status, age, 
education, financial conditions and altitude for taking business risks. 
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The situation for the emerging economy of China is, however, quite different. From 
1949 to 1978, the Chinese government followed the doctrine of the Socialist planned 
economy, eliminating virtually all the private enterprises in the economy and 
replacing them with state-owned enterprises. With material incentives completely 
suppressed under the planned economy, the Chinese economy came to a precarious 
state by mid 1970s, which led to the economic reform initiated in 1978. Unlike the 
formerly planned economies in the Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
however, China has taken a gradual approach in reforming its inefficient state-owned 
enterprises. One possible rationale for the gradual reform approach is that the Chinese 
government wants to maintain social stability during its reform process (Cao, Qian, 
and Weingast, 1999; Bai, Li, Tao and Wang, 2000; Bai, Lu and Tao, 2006a). In the 
first ten years of China’s economic reform from 1978 to 1988, the Chinese 
government started to open its economy to foreign trade and investment including 
entry of foreign invested firms; but there were still ideological biases against China’s 
indigenous private enterprises, the emergence and development of which was 
restricted to the rural areas (Qian, 2000). The legal status of private-ownership 
businesses was not granted until 1988, ten years after China started its economic 
reform. Article 11 of the 1988 amendment of the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China (approved by the First Plenary of the Seventh People’s Congress 
on April 12, 1988) reads: “The state permits the private sector of the economy to exist 
and develop within the limits prescribed by law. The private sector of the economy is 
a complement to the socialist public economy. The state protects the lawful rights and 
interests of the private sector of the economy, and exercises guidance, supervision and 
control over the private sector of the economy”. In the same year, three regulations 
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were issued by China’s State Council, which further specified rights and obligations 
of the private sector and provided executable protection for the private sector (Zhang 
and Ming, 2000).2 The role of private sector development was further elevated to 
being important to the Socialist market economy in the 1999 amendment of the 
Constitution (approved by the Second Plenary of the Ninth People’s Congress on 
March 15, 1999). Finally, in the 2004 amendment of the Constitution (approved by 
the Second Plenary of the Tenth People’s Congress on March 14, 2004), private sector 
development was called for, and formal protection of private property was offered.  
 
A survey of 3,073 private enterprises conducted in 2000 reveals that 39% of private 
entrepreneurs have paid informal levies for various government projects and 56% of 
them have called for anti-corruption policies, which reflecting poor protection of 
private properties (Bai, Lu and Tao, 2006b). The same survey also shows that, with 
the ambiguous legal status for private ownership, private enterprises have faced 
severe discrimination in all aspects of business operations. In particular, only 9.4% of 
the private entrepreneurs surveyed have resorted to the formal legal channels for 
dispute resolution. The unfavorable institutional environment (including property 
rights protection and contract enforcement) for entrepreneurship in China implies that, 
in contrast to the conventional theory of entrepreneurship for the developed 
economies, the legal status for private ownership should play an important role in the 
entrepreneurship decision for China’s would-be entrepreneurs.3 Specifically, during 
the sample period of our data set (1978-1994), Article 11 of the 1988 amendment of 
                                                 
2 These three regulations are: “The temporary regulation of private enterprises in China”, “The 
temporary regulation of company income taxes of private enterprises in China”, and “The temporary 
regulation of income taxes of individual investors in private enterprises in China”.  
3 Aldrich and Fiol (1994) study some of the unique issues facing innovating entrepreneurs. In entering 
into new industries, there is a relative lack of legitimacy, as both entrepreneurs and crucial stakeholders 
may not fully understand the nature of the new ventures and their conformity to established 
institutional rules may still be in question.  
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the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was a watershed as it formally 
permitted the existence of private enterprises in China. Thus, we have: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The granting of legal status for private enterprises in the 1988 
amendment of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China is expected to have 
a positive impact on the entrepreneurial activities in China.  
 
With the dominance of public ownership both before and after the economic reform 
initiated in 1978, China’s would-be entrepreneurs generally have to quit their 
positions in some public-ownership entities and then start their private ownership 
businesses. While the legal status for private ownership affects the would-be 
entrepreneurs’ benefit from starting private-ownership businesses, the cost of 
entrepreneurship is the payoffs the would-be entrepreneurs can have if they remain in 
the public-ownership entities. A would-be entrepreneur’s payoffs from remaining in 
public-ownership entities depend on the degree of public ownership of his current 
employer as well as his personal political participation. The entities of public 
ownership could be government agencies, public organizations, state-owned 
enterprises affiliated with the central government, state-owned enterprises affiliated 
with the local governments, collectively-owned enterprises, and others (including 
semi-private or even private enterprises), descending in the degree of public 
ownership. In any entity of public ownership, a person’s status is further enhanced 
and his control benefits are higher if he is a member of the Chinese Communist Party. 
This is because the Chinese Communist Party has control over the appointment of 
senior management of state-owned enterprises. In addition, membership of the 
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Chinese Communist Party is generally a precondition for senior positions in the 
government agencies or public organizations.4  We thus have: 
 
Hypothesis 2: A person in an entity of higher public-ownership status is less likely to 
become an entrepreneur, and in any public-ownership entity a person who is a 
member of the Chinese Communist Party is less likely to become an entrepreneur.   
 
Underlying hypotheses 1 and 2 is an opportunity selection model, where a person 
chooses between working for a public-ownership employer and becoming an 
entrepreneur. Specifically, the payoff from entrepreneurship can be simplified as the 
product of his company’s profit (denoted by R) and the quality of institutional 
environment for private sector development (denoted by p).5 The payoff from 
remaining an employee of the public-ownership entity is denoted by r, which in turn 
increases in the public ownership status of his current employer and the would-be 
entrepreneur’s degree of political participation. If a person is risk neutral, he would 
choose entrepreneurship if the payoff from entrepreneurship is higher than that of 
employment (i.e., pR>r), and hypotheses 1 and 2 follow immediately.  
 
In general, a would-be entrepreneur is risk averse. Given the more uncertain payoff 
from entrepreneurship than that of employment (more white noise in R than that of r), 
he would attach a premium (denoted by m) to the payoff from employment. That is, 
he would choose entrepreneurship if pR > (1+m)r. The more unfavorable institutional 
environment for private sector development, the higher the premium placed on the 
                                                 
4 Morduch and Sicular (2000) found that being a party member in rural China increases the possibility 
of becoming a cadre and enjoying political rents. In addition, Liu (2003) shows that political capital has 
positive and significant effects on individuals’ income in the early stage of China’s economic reform.  
5 It is assumed for simplicity that the profit is confiscated with probability (1-p).  
 11
payoff from employment. This suggests that m is increasing in p with m=0 if p=1. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 remain valid in this risk-aversion case. What is new is that there 
are interaction terms between the institutional environment for private sector 
development and the two variables determining the payoff from employment (the 
public ownership status of employer and the degree of political participation of 
would-be entrepreneurs). Specifically, we have:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The negative impacts of those would-be entrepreneurs’ personal 
attributes that determine their payoff from employment in the public-ownership 
entities attenuate as the institutional environment improves for private sector 
development.   
 
There are several studies in the sociology literature about the cost of entrepreneurship 
with hypotheses similar to our Hypothesis 2 (Wu, 2004; Spires, Zhang, and Pan, 
2004). The focus of this paper is about the impacts of the institutional environment for 
private sector development (hypothesis 1) and its interactions with would-be 
entrepreneurs’ personal attributes (hypothesis 3). The importance of the institutional 
environment is apparent from the seminal work of North (1990), and it is highly 
relevant to the case of China because of the ideological biases against private sector 
development throughout China’s economic reform. The interactions of the 
institutional environment with would-be entrepreneurs’ personal attributes are equally, 
if not more, important, as they imply structural changes in the determinants of 
entrepreneurship decision.  
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To summarize, we have outlined a theoretical framework for the entrepreneurship 
decision in the emerging economy of China with an emphasis on the role of the 
institutional environment and its interaction with would-be entrepreneurs’ personal 
attributes (Figure 1). We shall test the hypotheses developed based on the theoretical 




3. Data and Variables 
3.1. Data 
 
Our data comes from a life-histories survey conducted in 1994 in twenty cities of 
China. Six Chinese provinces (Hebei, Heilongjiang, Gansu, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and 
Sichuan) were chosen in addition to Beijing (China’s capital) and Shanghai (an 
important economic center in China). In each province, three cities were selected, 
including the provincial capital city (population over 1 million), a medium-sized city 
(population between 200,000 and 1 million), and a small city (population under 
200,000). These twenty cities covered a wide range of geographic locations with 
different types of urban economies (Zhou, 2000). The survey was conducted using 
stratified random sampling method. In China, urban households are organized in a 
four-level system: city, district, street, and residential block. In the survey, residential 
blocks were selected using a random sampling scheme. Households in each residential 
block were also selected using a random sampling scheme. Finally, a member 
between age 25 and 65 of the household was randomly selected to be interviewed. 
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The original data contains life-histories information of 4,073 urban residents between 
age 25 and 65, such as age, gender, marriage status, education, working experience, 
political participation, home ownership, family structure including information about 
their parents and spouse, and other social indicators. The survey required respondents 
to recall any spell of job, within or across work units, since their first jobs. The survey 
provides detailed information on up to ten job spells for each respondent, such as 
years started and left every job, and types of jobs.6  
 
Recall errors are inevitable in retrospective data. However, as job mobility has been 
relatively low in China, the respondents did not need to recall many job shifts and 
thus the errors in collecting data retrospectively should not be very serious. To 
minimize the recall error problem, we exclude respondents who did not recall their 
job histories clearly or whose job histories were not recorded continuously. The 




3.2.1. Dependent variable 
 
Based on the information of job spells of respondents, we first construct a job-year 
table which contains job information of respondents from the year they started 
working. Using the job-year table, we identify every job change of respondents, and 
pay particular attention to whether and when the respondents became entrepreneurs. 
The National Bureau of Statistics of China has classified people who started their own 
                                                 
6 There are two respondents who changed jobs more than ten times. These two respondents were 
excluded from the sample due to the lack of complete job histories, which are crucial for our analysis.  
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businesses into two types: those whose private enterprises hire less than eight 
employees (called Getihu in Chinese), and those whose private enterprises hire eight 
or more employees (called Siying Qiye in Chinese). In this paper, we do not make 
such a distinction and simply call those who started their own businesses as 
entrepreneurs. The dependent variable for the empirical study, denoted by 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, equals 1 when a respondent started his/her own business in a 
specific year and 0 otherwise. 
 
We focus on the time period of 1978 to 1994, because the choice of entrepreneurship 
was not possible in most parts of China prior to 1978 and in addition some of the 
independent variables have only been available since 1978. Table 1 gives detailed 
information on the number of surveyed respondents who were entrepreneurs for the 
time period of 1978 and 1994. Take 1978 as an example. Only 15 respondents were 
entrepreneurs in 1978, with 13 being the stock from the previous year and two new 
entrepreneurs in 1978. The table shows that the number of surveyed respondents 
being entrepreneurs increased from 15 in 1978 to 97 in 1994. The left axis of Figure 2 
shows that the percentage of entrepreneurs in the total number of surveyed 
respondents increased from 0.88% in 1978 to 4.02% in 1994. As China continues its 
economic reform, the general environment for private enterprises has been improving 
though the formal legal status of private enterprises was not granted until 1988, and 
hence the increase in entrepreneurship. What is interesting to note is that, among the 
new entrepreneurs, 72 had previous working experiences, presumably in public-
ownership entities (column 3 of Table 1) while 26 were fresh labor supplies directly 
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into entrepreneurship (column 2 of Table 1).7 The right axis of Figure 2 shows that the 
percentage of new entrepreneurs in the number of surveyed respondents who changed 
jobs increased from zero in 1978 to 10.61% in 1994. This suggests the importance of 
controlling for the costs of quitting positions in public-ownership entities when 
studying the determinants of entrepreneurship in China.  
 
 
3.2.2. Independent variables 
 
We first construct variables related to China’s institutional environment for private 
sector development (Hypothesis 1) and a special set of personal attributes related to 
the costs of entrepreneurship (Hypothesis 2). As discussed in Section 2, we use the 
legal status of private ownership businesses to proxy the institutional environment for 
private sector development. A dummy variable regarding the legal status of private-
ownership businesses, denoted by LEGAL POSITION, is constructed and it equals 1 
for years on or later than 1989, 0 otherwise. Meanwhile, we use two variables to 
proxy the payoffs of would-be entrepreneurs from remaining in the public-ownership 
entities (or the costs of entrepreneurship). The public-ownership entities could be of 
the following types: government agencies, public organizations, state-owned 
enterprises affiliated with the central government, state-owned enterprises affiliated 
with the local governments, collectively-owned enterprises, and others (including 
semi-private or even private enterprises). Government agencies and public 
                                                 
7 There were entrepreneurs who subsequently shut down their own businesses and joined other 
companies as employees. Such reverse decision to entrepreneurship, however, is not studied in this 
paper. For a theoretical study on the switch between employment and entrepreneurship, see Lévesque, 
Shepherd and Douglas (2002). 
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organizations are similar in nature and they are combined into one category, all state-
owned enterprises are also grouped into one category irrespective of their affiliation 
levels, and others (including private or semi-private enterprises) are treated as the 
reference category. Three dummies are thus constructed, which indicate whether the 
survey respondents worked in GOVERNMENT AGENCIES OR PUBLIC 
ORGANIZATIONS, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, or COLLECTIVE 
ENTERPRISES in specific years. And a time-dependent dummy variable, PARTY 
MEMBERSHIP, is also constructed, which takes 1 if a respondent was a member of 
the Chinese Communist Party in a specific year and 0 otherwise.  
 
Next, we construct a set of variables related to the personal attributes of would-be 
entrepreneurs other than those of the public-ownership status of their current 
employers and their political participation. They include variables about would-be 
entrepreneurs’ gender, marriage status, age, education, their financial conditions for 
pursuing entrepreneurial activities, and their altitude for taking the risks of starting 
own businesses. MALE equals 1 for male respondents and 0 for female ones. 
MARRIAGE indicates marriage status of respondents in specific years, with 1 for 
married and 0 otherwise. AGE is the age of a respondent in a specific year. 
EDUCATION is measured by the number of years respondents had in formal 
education. It is zero for those respondents who are illiterate, five for those who had 
primary school education, eight for those with junior high school education, 11 for 
those with senior high school education, 13 for those respondents who had technical 
school education (Zhongzhuan in Chinese), 14 for those with polytechnics education 
(Dazhuan in Chinese), 15 for those respondents who had college education, and 
finally, 18 for those with graduate school education.  
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Would-be entrepreneurs’ financial conditions have been found to be an important 
determinant for their entrepreneurial activities (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen, 
1994; Hurst and Lusardi, 2004). This is because starting private-ownership businesses 
often requires a lot of financial resources. Even in the developed economies, would-be 
entrepreneurs may have difficulty getting access to external finance due to the 
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. As a result, would-be 
entrepreneurs may have to rely on their own savings and wealth to meet the financial 
needs of starting own businesses. In China, the financial markets are much less 
developed than those of the advanced economies. In addition, in the absence of formal 
protection of private properties, there could be expropriation of and discrimination 
against private enterprises, with their access to external finance severely restricted 
(Wei and Wang, 1997; Bai, Lu and Tao, 2006b). Hence, in China, the role of would-be 
entrepreneurs’ financial conditions is expected to be significant in their 
entrepreneurship decision. 
 
Inheritances or gifts are used as a measure of would-be entrepreneurs’ financial 
conditions in the existing literature (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004). But we do not think it 
is a good measure in the setting of China for two reasons. First, the Chinese people 
remain relatively poor despite more than two decades of economic reform, and hence 
inheritances or gifts may not be that significant. Second, as the Chinese government 
remains predatory, people like to hide their wealth away from the government, which 
implies that information on inheritances or gifts is difficult to get in China. Instead, 
we use would-be entrepreneurs’ home ownership as a measure of their financial 
conditions, for would-be entrepreneurs could mortgage their homes for bank loans 
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and get support for their entrepreneurial activities. In China, ownership of a person’s 
dwelling could be of the following four types: owned by respondent’s work unit, 
owned by other relative’s (including his/her spouse) work unit, other types of public 
housing, and privately owned. HOME OWNERSHIP equals 1 if a respondent had 
private housing or apartment in a specific year and 0 otherwise. 
 
Starting one’s own businesses involves a lot of risks as compared with employment 
for other companies. Hence an important determinant of entrepreneurship is the 
altitude for taking business risks. It is found in the existing literature that a person is 
more willing to take risk if his parents have had entrepreneurial experiences.8 
Presumably, preference for taking business risks could be genetically endowed. In 
addition, intergenerational transfer of knowledge about starting and managing 
businesses is valuable when there are few formal learning opportunities available as in 
the early stage of China’s economic reform.9 It has also been found in the literature 
that a person is more willing to become an entrepreneur if he has had frequent job 
changes. Presumably, a person having more frequent job changes may encounter more 
misfits, hence having lower opportunity costs of becoming an entrepreneur. 
Meanwhile, a person experiencing more frequent job changes tends to have wider job 
experiences, which have been argued as a positive determinant for entrepreneurial 
activities (Lazear, 2003). Two independent variables are thus constructed accordingly. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL PARENT is a dummy variable indicating whether father or 
                                                 
8 Some studies have shown that only positive entrepreneurial experiences by parents have a positive 
impact on their children’s decision to become entrepreneurs (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000). 
Nonetheless, it could be argued that children may learn more about how to do business from the 
failures as opposed to successes of their parents provided that they are generically inclined for 
entrepreneurial adventures.   
9 Because of the emphasis on central planning, business education was suspended in China’s tertiary 
institutions prior to its economic reform initiated in 1978. Business education was resumed in mid 
1980s, and American-style Master of Business Administration programs were first offered in China in 
early 1990s.    
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mother of a respondent had been an entrepreneur before a specific year.10 JOB 
CHANGE FREQ is defined as the number of job shifts divided by total labor-market 
experience (i.e., the total years of working experience) for a respondent in a specific 
year.  
 
Table 2 gives the definition and summary statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables discussed in this section, and Table 3 lists the correlation among the 
variables.   
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Econometric methods 
 
We use the logit model for discrete-time event history analysis, which allows us to 
incorporate time-varying covariates to account for the rate of event occurrence (Tuma 
and Hannan, 1984). It shifts the unit of analysis from respondents to life events at a 
specific time. In this case, all those people who have not yet become entrepreneurs are 
considered “at risk” of entry into entrepreneurship in each year starting from 1978. 
Those who had not yet become entrepreneurs by 1994 are right-censored. The model 
takes the following form: log( /(1 )) ( )it itP P x t β′− = , where Pit is the conditional 
probability that individual i experiences an event (i.e., entry into entrepreneurship) at 
time t (i.e., year), given that the event has not already occurred to that individual, x (t) 
is a set of time-varying covariates and β  is a vector of coefficients of these covariates. 
                                                 
10 The survey provides information about the types of jobs of both respondents’ father and mother at six 
points in time: the year he/she started working, and 1965, 1975, 1978, 1986, and 1993.  
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We also include city dummies to control for possible differences across regions in 
economic development.  
 
Institutional environment, including secure protection of private properties and 
efficient contract enforcement, is important for economic growth in general (North, 
1990) and private sector development in the emerging and transition economies in 
particular (see, for example, Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff, 2002; Cull and Xu, 
2005). In the case of China, the institutional environment has been rather unfavorable 
for private sector development, due to its gradual reform approach to state-owned 
enterprises and persistent ideological biases against private sector development. 
Before 1988, there was no formal legal status for private enterprises, and private 
sector development was restricted to China’s rural areas (Qian, 2000). The 1988 
amendment of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China regarding the legal 
status of private enterprises significantly reduced the uncertainty for people to quit 
positions in public-ownership entities and start private-ownership businesses.  
 
In our analysis, we consider three ways of estimating the impacts of the institutional 
environment (proxied by the legal-status variable) on the entrepreneurship decision 
and its interactions with other determinants of entrepreneurship. First, we have all the 
independent variables discussed in Section 3, including the legal-status variable, in the 
specification to test the “main effects” on entrepreneurial activities. It is assumed in 
this specification that the granting of legal status for private enterprises does not cause 
any structural change in the impacts of other determinants of entrepreneurship. The 
regression results are reported in column 1 of Table 4. Second, we separate our 
sample into two sub-samples: one before the granting of legal status for private 
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enterprises (henceforth called pre-1989 sample) and the other after the granting of 
legal status for private enterprises (called post-1989 sample), and exclude the LEGAL 
POSITION variable in the specification. Here the focus is on whether the other 
independent variables affect the respondents’ entry into entrepreneurship differently in 
these two time periods. The regression results for the two sub-samples are reported in 
columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 respectively. Finally, to investigate both the role of the 
institutional environment and its interactions with other determinants of 
entrepreneurship, we add their interaction terms to the specification of the first 
regression (the one reported in column 1 of Table 4), and report the results in Table 5.  
 
 
4.2. Results and Discussion  
4.2.1. Main results 
 
We would like to first report our results related to the institutional environment for 
private sector development. As shown in Column 1 of Table 4, the coefficient of 
LEGAL POSITION is positive and statistically significant at 1% level, implying that 
the surveyed respondents were more likely to become entrepreneurs after the granting 
of legal status for private enterprises in 1988. Our empirical finding offers strong 
support to Hypothesis 1 that the institutional environment is an important determinant 
for the entrepreneurial activities in the emerging economy of China. We also notice 
that the impacts of other independent variables in the pre-1989 sample differ from 
those in the post-1989 sample, mostly in terms of the magnitude or statistical 
significance of coefficients rather than the sign of coefficients (columns 2 and 3 of 
Table 4). This suggests that the granting of legal status for private enterprises in 1988 
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may have caused some structural changes in the impacts of the other determinants of 
entrepreneurship. In what follows, we mainly report the results of the other 
independent variables in the full sample, and we also highlight those cases where 
there are differences in results between the pre-1989 sample and the post-1989 sample.  
 
Now we focus on the empirical validity of Hypothesis 2 that a person in an entity of 
higher public-ownership status is less likely to become an entrepreneur, and in any 
public-ownership entity a person who is a member of the Chinese Communist Party is 
less likely to become an entrepreneur. As shown in column 1 of Table 4, the odds of 
becoming entrepreneurs for people working in government agencies or public 
organizations, state-owned enterprises, and collective enterprises are 12.1%, 14.5% 
and 54.8%11 of the odds for people working in the benchmark category (semi-private 
or private enterprises), respectively. Comparing the results of the pre-1989 sample 
with those of the post-1989 sample (columns 2 and 3 of Table 4), we also find that the 
coefficients of the various dummies for the public-ownership status (i.e., government 
agency or public organization, state-owned enterprises, and collectively-owned 
enterprises) are all less negative in the post-1989 sample than those of the pre-1989 
sample. This implies that with the granting of legal status for private enterprises in 
1988, the opportunity costs of quitting public-ownership entities have become lower 
and hence lower negative effects of the public-ownership status on the 
entrepreneurship decision.   
 
Meanwhile our results show that the coefficients of PARTY MEMBERSHIP in both the 
pre-1989 sample and the post-1989 sample are negative, indicating that party 
                                                 
11 The percentages are obtained as follows: e-2.110-1=12.1%, e-1.929-1=14.5% and e-0.601-1=54.8%. 
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membership reduces the possibility of entrepreneurship. The net odds of 
entrepreneurship for party members are 12.67 percent of the odds for people who are 
not party members in the pre-1989 sample, but the corresponding number for the post-
1989 sample is increased to 39.73 percent, indicating that the negative impacts of 
party membership on entrepreneurship are diminishing over time. In addition, only the 
coefficient of PARTY MEMBERSHIP in the pre-1989 sample is statistically significant. 
This suggests that, with the granting of legal status for private enterprises in 1988, the 
opportunity costs for members of the Chinese Communist Party to quit public-
ownership entities have become lower and hence increased probability of 
entrepreneurship. Overall, our results offer strong support to Hypothesis 2 that the 
payoffs of would-be entrepreneurs from remaining in public-ownership entities are an 
important consideration in their entrepreneurship decision.    
 
As discussed in Section 2, the quality of the institutional environment for private 
sector development affects the premium placed by would-be entrepreneurs on their 
payoffs from employment in public ownership entities. This implies interactions 
between the institutional environment and the other determinants of entrepreneurship, 
which in turn explains why the latter has different impacts on the entrepreneurship 
decision in the pre-1989 and the post-1989 sub-samples (columns 2 and 3 of Table 4). 
Therefore we add the interaction terms between the institutional environment and the 
other determinants into the specification of the regression reported in column 1 of 
Table 4. It turns out that our early results related to hypotheses 1 and 2 remain robust 
under this general specification. LEGAL POSITION has positive and statistically 
significant impact on entrepreneurship, while PARTY MEMBERSHIP and the three 
variables about the public ownership status (GOVERNMENT OR PUBLIC 
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ORGANIZATION, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, and COLLECTIVE 
ENTERPRISES) have negative and significant impacts on entrepreneurship (see Table 
5 for details). More importantly, the interaction terms between LEGAL POSITION and 
the latter group of variables all have positive coefficients, with those for LEGAL 
POSITION *  PARTY MEMBERSHIP  and LEGAL POSITION * COLLECTIVE 
ENTERPRISES being statistically significant. These results imply that the negative 
impacts those would-be entrepreneurs’ personal attributes that determine their payoffs 
from employment in public-ownership entities attenuate as the institutional 
environment improves for private sector development, lending strong support to 
Hypothesis 3.    
 
 
4.2.2. Controls for other personal attributes of would-be entrepreneurs 
 
While the main focus of this paper is on the impacts of institutional environment for 
the entrepreneurship decision in China and those of the personal attributes that are 
related to the costs of quitting positions in public-ownership entities, we need to 
control for the impacts of some general determinants (personal attributes of would-be 
entrepreneurs such as gender, marital status, age, financial conditions and their 
altitude for taking business risks) that have been found to be important in the existing 
literature. It turns out that the impacts of those general determinants depend on the 
institutional environment for private ownership, which offers an even more important 
reason for their inclusion in the analysis.  
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The result in column 1 of Table 4 shows that, in the whole sample, older people are 
less likely to become entrepreneurs. However, when testing the effect of age in the 
two sub-samples, the negative and statistically significant coefficient of AGE was 
only found in the pre-1989 sample (column 2 of Table 4). This implies that the 
negative effect of age on entrepreneurship became weak after the legal status for 
private enterprises was granted in 1988. Presumably, older people are more risk 
averse; but with the reduced risk of starting private-ownership businesses after 1988, 
those old people became more receptive to entrepreneurship.12 As for the impact of 
gender, we find that, in China, males are more likely to become entrepreneurs than 
females, consistent with what is found in the literature (Blanchflower, and Oswald, 
1998). Existing studies have found the positive effect of marriage on entrepreneurship 
(Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen, 1994; Blanchflower, and Oswald, 1998). 
However, we found that marriage status does not affect people’s decision of 
entrepreneurship.  
 
Education is used as an indicator of earning capability in the existing literature. Its 
impacts on entrepreneurship are difficult to predict theoretically. On the one hand, it 
could be argued that people with higher education have stronger ability of starting 
own businesses, and hence the impact of education on entrepreneurship decision 
should be positive (the ability argument). On the other hand, it could be argued that 
                                                 
12 We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the importance of social relationship 
(or Guanxi) in the transition and emerging economy of China. In the presence of dominant public 
sector, party affiliation and public-ownership status are proxies for the social relationship that would-be 
entrepreneurs have accumulated. Meanwhile the tenure in public ownership entities is another proxy 
for social relationship. It has been argued that social relationship is more important in private 
entrepreneurship, in which case party affiliation, public-ownership status of employers and age are 
expected to have positive impacts on entrepreneurship. Our empirical findings are, however, just the 
opposite, and they are consistent with the argument put forward by Walder (2003) that, with economic 
reform and partial privatization, there are more values being injected into publicly-owned assets hence 
creating unprecedented opportunities for elite insiders. 
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people with higher education have higher opportunity costs of leaving their current 
employment and therefore become more risk averse toward entrepreneurship (the 
opportunity cost argument). We find that in the case of China the impact of education 
on entrepreneurship is negative implying that the opportunity cost argument is more 
dominant than the ability argument.13 What is more interesting is that one year of 
schooling decreases the net odds of becoming entrepreneurs by 20 percent in the pre-
1989 sample but this negative effect is reduced to 10 percent in the post-1989 sample. 
Clearly with the formal legal status of private enterprises granted in 1988, there has 
been less risk of starting private-ownership businesses, and the opportunity cost 
argument has become less dominant than the ability argument, and hence the 
decreasing negative impact of education on the entrepreneurship decision.  
 
Regarding the impacts of would-be entrepreneurs’ financial conditions on their 
entrepreneurship decision, we find that the probability of becoming entrepreneurs for 
those owning their own dwelling is 2.3 times that of those who do not in our full 
sample (column 1 of Table 4). In addition, those who own their own dwelling are only 
1.87 times more likely to become entrepreneurs than those who do not in the pre-1989 
sample, but are 4.07 times more likely in the post-1989 sample (columns 2 and 3 of 
Table 4). One possible explanation is that, with the formal legal status granted for 
private enterprises in 1988, there has been less risk of starting businesses and hence 
more entrepreneurial activities. It is also possible that, with less legal risk for starting 
one’s own businesses, would-be entrepreneurs would like to start more capital-
intensive businesses. As the financial markets in China remain rudimentary, the higher 
demand for financial resources (due to either more entrepreneurial activities or more 
                                                 
13 This is in contrast to the finding of Davidsson and Honig (2003) that human capital as measured by 
years of schooling has a significant and positive effect on entrepreneurship decision. 
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capital-intensive entrepreneurial activities) means increasing advantage for those who 
have their own financial resources.14  
 
Regarding the impacts of would-be entrepreneurs’ altitude for taking business risks, 
we find that parents’ entrepreneurial experiences have positive effects on respondents’ 
decisions for becoming entrepreneurs. In the full-sample, a person’s chance of 
becoming an entrepreneur increases by 87 percent if his parents have had 
entrepreneurial experience. More interestingly, the corresponding number for the pre-
1989 sample is 209% and that for the post-1989 sample is 49%, with only the 
coefficient for the pre-1989 sample being statistically significant. There are two 
possible explanations for the positive impacts of parents’ entrepreneurial experiences 
on children’s decision to be entrepreneurs. One is that preference for taking business 
risks could be genetically endowed, and the other is that children could learn from 
their parents’ entrepreneurial experiences (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Dunn and 
Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Djankov, Qian, Roland and Zhuravskaya, 2006). Our findings of 
decreasing role of parents’ entrepreneurial experiences over time imply more support 
for the inter-generational learning argument than the genetic endowment argument. 
Consistently, as China continues its economic reform, there are increasingly more 
formal channels (such as college education in business and economics, and the 
mushrooming growth of the American-style Master of Business Administration 
programs) through which would-be entrepreneurs can learn how to start and manage 
                                                 
14 Our data set has information on the industries involved by the ninety eight entrepreneurs covered 
during the sample period (1978-1994). Four out of the eight industries involved (the raw material and 
chemical industry, the electronic industry, the transport industry, and the metal products and machinery 
industry) are considered to be more capital intensive than the other four (the agriculture industry, the 
textile industry, the construction industry, and the catering service industry). It is found that the number 
of new entrepreneurs in the more capital-intensive industries in the pre-1989 sample is 14 out of 53 
cases (or 26%), while the corresponding number for the post-1989 sample is 21 out of 45 cases (or 
47%). 
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own businesses, and hence the decreasing impact of parents’ entrepreneurial 
experiences.15  
 
In addition to the results on ENTREPRENEURIAL PARENT as a proxy for the altitude 
of taking business risks, we find that a doubling of JOB CHANGE FREQ (from one in 
last five years to two) leads to 168% increase in the probability of becoming 
entrepreneurs, which is consistent with the two theoretical arguments related to job 
change frequency: People having more frequent job changes may encounter more 
misfits and hence have lower opportunity costs for quitting current jobs for 
entrepreneurial activities (Miller, 1984), and they could also accumulate wider ranges 
of skills which are essential for successful entrepreneurship (Lazear, 2003). We also 
find that the positive effects of job change frequency are stronger in the post-1989 
sample than that in the pre-1989 sample. It is possible that as China undergoes the 
transition from a planned economy to a market economy, the set of skills needed for 
successful entrepreneurship increases and hence the increasing positive effects of job 
change frequency.  
 
From the above analysis, it is clear that the impacts of these general determinants of 
entrepreneurship change as the institutional environment improves. To find out if 
there is a structural change in the determinants of entrepreneurship triggered by the 
change in the institutional environment, we carry out the regression analysis using the 
most general specification (that of Table 5). We find that there are positive and 
statistically significant interactions between the institutional environment and two of 
the general determinants (AGE and JOB SHIFT FREQ). The improvement in the 
                                                 
15 For details on business education in China, please visit the website of China’s Ministry of Education 
at http://www.moe.edu.cn/english/index.htm. 
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institutional environment for private sector development encourages older people and 
those with more frequent job shifts to pursue entrepreneurship, mitigating the negative 
effect of AGE and further enhancing the positive effect of JOB SHIFT FREQ. 
Together with the findings in Section 4.2.1, these results demonstrate the importance 




5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper examines the determinants of entrepreneurship in the emerging economy 
of China with a focus on the impacts of institutional environment for private sector 
development (North, 1990) and its interactions with other determinants of 
entrepreneurship. Using a life-histories survey data of 2,854 respondents from twenty 
cities in China, we find strong support for the role of institutional environment for the 
entrepreneurship decision, and for the importance of the personal attributes of would-
be entrepreneurs such as the public-ownership status of their current employers and 
their status within those entities that determine their costs of entrepreneurship. Our 
results are robust to the controls for other personal attributes of would-be 
entrepreneurs (such as gender, marital status, age, education, financial conditions, and 
altitude for taking business risks) that have been found to be important in the existing 
literature. More importantly we find that the institutional environment has statistically 
significant interactions with personal attributes of would-be entrepreneurs, implying a 
structural change in the determinants of entrepreneurship. Overall, our study on the 
determinants of entrepreneurial activities in China highlights the importance of the 
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institutional environment for private sector development and has important 
implications for policy recommendations. 
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           H3              H1 
 
 
 Institutional Environment 
(Legal status of the private 
sector) 
Personal Attributes 
Party affiliation and the public 
ownership status 

























Percentage of entrepreneurs Rate of entry into entrepreneurship
 
Note: The left axe shows the percentage of entrepreneurs to total respondents who were on the job market in various years. The 
right axe shows the rate of entry into entrepreneurship to the total number of people who changed their jobs in various years. 
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who did not have any 
working experiences
New entrepreneurs 
who had working 
experiences 
Number of 
entrepreneurs in the 
previous year 
1978 15 2 0 13
1979 16 1 1 14
1980 15 0 1 14
1981 20 4 2 14
1982 26 5 1 20
1983 32 3 3 26
1984 35 1 2 32
1985 41 3 3 35
1986 48 2 6 40
1987 55 1 6 48
1988 60 1 5 54
1989 69 1 8 60
1990 73 2 5 66
1991 83 0 10 73
1992 84 0 4 80
1993 92 0 8 84
1994 97 0 7 90
Total 861 26 72 763
 Note: The reason that number of entrepreneurs in the previous year (column 4) is not equal to lagged number of 
entrepreneurs (column 1) is that some people retired in corresponding years. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition N Mean Std Min Max
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1 if the respondent is an entrepreneur in a specific year,
 0 otherwise 40263 0.003 0.052 0 1
     
MALE 1 for male, 0 for female 40204 0.600 0.490 0 1
     
MARRIAGE 1 if married, 0 otherwise 40263 0.782 0.413 0 1
     
AGE Age of the respondent 4026335.665 10.362 15 65
     
EDUCATION Number of years the respondent had in formal 
education 40263 9.523 3.608 0 18
     
HOME OWNERSHIP 1 if the respondent had private housing, 0 otherwise 40263 0.221 0.415 0 1
     
ENTERPRENEURIAL PARENT 1 if at least one parent of the respondent had been 
entrepreneur, 0 otherwise 40263 0.027 0.162 0 1
     
JOB CHANGE FREQ The number of job shifts divided by total years of 
working experience 402630.0345 0.0516 0 0.5
     
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES  
OR PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS 
1 for respondents who worked in government agencies or 
public organizations in a specific year, 0 otherwise  40263 0.216 0.412 0 1
     
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 1 for respondents who worked in state-owned enterprises 
in a specific year, 0 otherwise 40263 0.474 0.499 0 1
     
COLLECTIVE ENTERPRISES 1 for respondents who worked in collective enterprises in 
a specific year, 0 otherwise 40263 0.136 0.343 0 1
     
PARTY MEMBERSHIP 1 if the respondent is a member if the Chinese 
Communist Party in a specific year, 0 otherwise 40263 0.169 0.375 0 1
     




Table 3: Correlation Table 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1 1            
MALE 2 0.005 1           
MARRIAGE 3 -0.025 -0.065 1          
AGE 4 -0.031 0.030 0.487 1         
EDUCATION 5 -0.022 0.087 -0.144 -0.234 1        
HOME OWNERSHIP 6 0.035 -0.017 0.045 0.001 -0.183 1       
ENTERPRENEURIAL PARENT 7 0.009 0.011 -0.005 0.024 0.017 0.024 1      
JOB CHANGE FREQ 8 0.049 0.046 0.028 -0.047 0.151 -0.054 -0.015 1     
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES  9 -0.022 -0.015 0.102 0.132 0.221 -0.063 -0.003 0.074 1    
or PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS              
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 10 -0.035 0.076 0.092 0.054 -0.047 -0.084 -0.016 -0.008 -0.399 1   
COLLECTIVE ENTERPRISES 11 0.021 -0.080 0.020 -0.010 -0.196 0.170 0.003 -0.033 -0.209 -0.377 1  
PARTY MEMBERSHIP 12 -0.021 0.155 0.194 0.289 0.058 -0.092 -0.012 0.132 0.155 0.019 -0.107 1 
LEGAL POSITION 13 0.017 0.016 0.140 0.214 0.089 0.011 0.007 -0.001 0.029 0.024 -0.011 0.023 1 
 Note: Numbers in bold are statistically significant at 5% level. 
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Table 4: Coefficient Estimates for Discrete-Time Hazard Models on Entrepreneurship 
decision 
 
 Independent Variables Full Sample Pre-1989 sample Post-1989 sample 
MALE 0.380 * 0.397 0.427 
 (0.200) (0.260) (0.337) 
  
MARRIAGE -0.015 0.192 -0.052 
 (0.259) (0.350) (0.436) 
  
AGE -0.072 *** -0.087 *** -0.027 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.021) 
  
EDUCATION -0.197 *** -0.224 *** -0.108 ** 
 (0.032) (0.041) (0.054) 
  
HOME OWNERSHIP 0.836 *** 0.625 ** 1.404 *** 
 (0.206) (0.269) (0.343) 
  
ENTERPRENEURIAL PARENT 0.627 1.128 ** 0.398 
 (0.436) 0.528 (0.747) 
  
JOB CHANGE FREQ 0.985 *** 0.856 *** 1.221 *** 
 (0.098) (0.143) (0.151) 
  
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES -2.110 *** -2.331 *** -1.643 ** 
OR PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS (0.470) (0.732) (0.640) 
  
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES -1.929 *** -2.135 *** -1.459 *** 
 (0.288) (0.395) (0.367) 
  
COLLECTIVE ENTERPRISES -0.601 *** -0.962 *** -0.067 
 (0.233) (0.324) (0.367) 
  
PARTY MEMBERSHIP -1.395 * -2.066 *** -0.923 
 (0.730) (0.205) (0.760) 
  
LEGAL POSITION 1.167 ***   
 (0.207)   
  
INTERCEPT -2.336 *** -1.327 * -4.469 *** 
 (0.540) (0.689) (1.049) 
  
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
-2 Log-likelihood -1529 -917 -611 
Chi2 305.31 171.20 131.17 
Person-year at risk 40204 25468 14736 
Event 111  66  45  







Table 5: Event History Analysis Results with Interaction Terms 
Independent Variables Full Sample 
MALE 0.375 
 (0.296) 












EDUCATION*LEGAL POSITION 0.054 
 (0.658) 
HOME OWNERSHIP 0.647** 
 (0.304) 
HOME OWNERSHIP *LEGAL POSITION 0.504 
 (0.425) 
ENTERPRENEURIAL PARENT 1.101* 
 (0.607) 
ENTERPRENEURIAL PARENT *LEGAL POSITION -0.592 
 (0.868) 
JOB CHANGE FREQ 0.769*** 
 (0.164) 
JOB CHANGE FREQ *LEGAL POSITION 0.426** 
 (0.214) 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES OR PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS -2.074*** 
 (0.738) 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES OR PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS *LEGAL POSITION 0.174 
 (0.968) 
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES -2.202*** 
 (0.452) 
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES*LEGAL POSITION 0.708 
 (0.599) 
COLLECTIVE ENTERPRISES -1.262*** 
 (0.398) 
COLLECTIVE ENTERPRISES*LEGAL POSITION 1.196** 
 (0.511) 
PARTY MEMBERSHIP -1.245** 
 (0.601) 
PARTY MEMBERSHIP*LEGAL POSITION 1.142** 
 (0.485) 
LEGAL POSITION 2.016* 
 (1.176) 
City Dummies Yes 
-2 Log-likelihood -1529 
Chi2 326.15 
Person-year at risk 40204 
Event 111  
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